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Article 5

The Trigen Case: Does This Mean Lights
Out for Energy Deregulation?
Kate O'Loughlin*

I. Introduction
Many of us come home in the evening to flip on the lights,
grab a cool drink from the refrigerator, recharge our cellular phones,
and sit down in front of the television. We do not give a second
thought to where the power for these functions comes from until the
electric bill arrives each month or we attempt to turn something on
and nothing happens. Many of us take electricity for granted until it is
unavailable or its cost skyrockets.
Recently, the term "energy deregulation" has become a tendollar buzzword. Historically, the electricity markets have been
highly regulated monopolies run predominantly by state
governments. 1 In the wake of federal deregulation initiatives, there is
a movement within the states to deregulate or "re-regulate" their
electricity markets to foster competition. To date, twenty-four states
have passed electric power deregulation laws. These efforts have
been marked by successes like Pennsylvania 3 and disasters like
California.4 Illinois passed legislation deregulating its electricity
* J.D.

candidate, May 2003, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; B.A.
summa cum laude, Economics, 2000, University of Illinois Urbana - Champaign.
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Joseph Kearney & Thomas Merril, The Great Transformation of Regulated
IndustriesLaw, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1323, 1327 (1998).
2 Tammy Williamson, CornEd Ad Spokeswoman Near the Center of Power;
Strobel Puts Human Face on Utility's Promises, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 18, 2001,
Financial at 43.
3 Ken Zapinski, Pennsylvania is Ahead of the Game, available at
http://www.post-gazette.comlenergy/states.asp (last visited Apr. 28, 2002).
4 Steven Pearlstein, How Supply, Demand & Maybe "Market Power" Inflated
a $273 Commodity, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2001, at A09.
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market in 1997, and it is being implemented in increments. 5 The goal
of this deregulation movement is to increase efficiency in the
production and distribution of electricity, cut costs, and reduce
consumer prices.
Electric companies' new found ability to compete in the
market for electricity generation has encouraged states across the
country to pass what they consider to be "deregulation legislation. 7
However, deregulation is a misnomer. Deregulation suggests the
abolition of federal and state regulations, leaving the determination of
supply and demand to independent market forces. 8 Currently, supply
and demand in the electric industry is far from determined solely
through independent market forces. Most electric deregulation
legislation distinguishes between
generation markets
and
transmission' ° and distribution markets."i While many states are
beginning to relax regulations and introduce competition for
generation, the transmission and distribution markets are still natural
monopolies and are highly regulated. 12
Although electricity generation companies can produce
electricity to supply customers across the county, the means of

5 Tammy Williamson, Unplugging from CornEd; With Market Deregulated

and Economy Struggling, Companies Analyze Bills, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 26,

2001, Financial at 59. Illinois' attempt at deregulation is codified in The Electric
Service Customer Choice and Rate Relief Law of 1997, 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16101 - 5/17-600 (1997).
6 Citizen's Utility Board, Deregulation of the Electric Industry (Fall 2000), at
http://www.cuboard.org/Electric.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2002).
7 Kearney & Merril, supra note 1,at 1324-25.
8

Id.

9 Jeffery D. Schwartz, The Use of the Antitrust Doctrine in the Deregulated
Electricity Industry, 48 AM. U.L. REv. 1449, 1466 (1999) ("Generation involves

the basic conversion of one energy source - e.g., coal, uranium, solar radiation, etc.
- into electrical energy.").
10 Id. at

1467 ("Transmission involves the process of moving electrical energy
from the point of generation to a wholesale purchaser located near the ultimate
consumer. Transmission is analogous to a 'wholesale' delivery.").

11Id. ("Distribution is the retail delivery of electricity and involves the
transportation of electrical energy from the transmission system to the consumer.").
12

See Ray S. Bolze, Utility Restructuring Drawing Back the Regulatory

Curtain: Antitrust Issues and Hypothetical Problems, 1274 PRACTISNG L. INST.
CORP. 23, 31 (Oct. 22-23, 2001).
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distribution is controlled by few.' 3 Electricity transmission grids, the
means of transmitting and distributing electricity, are expensive to
build and each geographic area needs only one.14 Thus, states that
have passed electric deregulation laws have not deregulated
electricity distribution, they have re-regulated it by requiring statesponsored utilities that have energy distribution monopolies to open
their distribution grids to competitors for the same price they charge
their affiliate generators. 15
As with any legislation reform, the success of these countrywide state plans is inevitably affected by several different variables.
One suggested variable is the highly publicized Trigen-Oklahoma
City Energy Corp. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. case decided in
April 2001.1 6 In Trigen, the court extended the State Action
Immunity Doctrine 17 ("state action doctrine") to include a state
regulated electric utility company, thus exempting it8 from federal
antitrust prosecution under the Sherman Antitrust Act.'
This article will give a short history of the electric industry
and efforts to deregulate or "re-regulate" it. Then it will briefly
discuss the Sherman Act and the state action doctrine. The article will
then analyze Trigen and its potential effect on Illinois' attempt to
deregulate its electricity markets. Lastly, it will address what effect, if
any, Trigen will have on consumer electricity prices.

II. Background
A. Monopolies in the Electric Power Industry
Historically, the electric power industry has been dominated
by vertically integrated monopolies.' 9 The country was divided into
service territories and each territory was regarded as a "'natural

13 Id.
14 id.

'5
16

See Citizen's Utility Board, supra note 6.
244 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 459 (2001).

17 See

Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).

18 Trigen, 244

F.3d at 1223.

19States' utility companies were vertical monopolies because they controlled
the entire chain of supply for electricity beginning with its generation and ending
with the distribution of that electricity into consumers' homes. See Bolze, supra
note 12, at 31.
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monopoly' because it was not economically practical to invest in
more than one distribution system in each service territory or to
construct more generators than necessary to provide full capacity and
reliability to that territory.,, 2 ° Both state and federal governments
regulated these monopolies. 21 The state government regulated
company operations and retail prices, and the federal government,
through the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"),
regulated wholesale transactions and interstate electricity
transmission. 22 In the monopoly, one state-regulated company,
known as a "utility," provided customers in a specific geographic
area with all of their electricity needs.23 This was known as the
"bundling" of services. 24 The utility generated and distributed
electricity on its own distribution grid. 25 Since one company
monopolized the market for energy generation and distribution in a
specific area, the state set the price the company could charge in
order to protect consumers. 26 Electricity suppliers were required to
file a tarif 27 with the state regulatory commission showing that their
consumer rates were fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory. 28 If the
state regulatory commission approved the proposed29 tariff, it became
the price utilities charged consumers for electricity.
Gradually, advances in technology made it possible to
transmit electric energy over much longer distances. This paved the
way for interconnection among utility transmission networks, thus
creating increased reliability and improved economy of service for

20

Bolze, supra note 12, at 31.

21

Id.

22 id.
23

Id. at 32.

24 Id.

25

A distribution grid is the physical structure through which electricity is

transmitted. Id.
26 Kearney & Merril, supra note 1, at 1330-3 1.
27

Tariffs are price proposals created by utilities outlining the rates the utilities

would like to charge consumers based on their costs and a set profit margin. See
Citizen's Utility Board, supra note 6.
28 Kearney & Merril, supra note 1, at 1330-31.
29

Id. at 1331.

30 Bolze, supra note 12, at 32.
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consumers. 3' Also, this ultimately allowed electricity transmission
networks to span multiple states. Today, energy generated in Ohio
can travel across a multi-state transmission network and be used in
Illinois, thus opening up the local electricity generation market to
competition.
While technology opened the electricity generation market to
the possibility of competition, the electricity transmission and
distribution markets retained their monopolistic characteristics
because a given geographic area only needed one distribution grid.32
Local utilities owned and operated the grids, and therefore, the only
means of transmitting and distributing electricity. 33 In order to
succeed in opening the generation market to competition, private
generating companies
had to obtain access to the monopolized
34
distribution grids.
The federal government began the deregulation process in
1996 when FERC issued Order No. 888. 35 This order required
utilities with monopolies over electricity transmission systems to
permit third parties to transmit electricity over the their lines, a
process known as "wheeling," 36 under terms and conditions no less
favorable than those offered to the utilities' own generating
affiliates.37 The purpose of the order was "to ensure that customers
had the benefits of competitively priced generation." 38 Although its
aim was pro-competitive, this order only affected the wholesale
market for electric power, 39 because electricity generation and
distribution was historically regulated by the state. The federal
government could ensure the independent generators' electricity was
"' Id. at 31.
32 Kearney & Merril, supra note 1, at 1354.
33

Id.

34

Id. at 1353-54.

35 Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs.
31,652, 61 Fed. Reg. 21540-01 (1996).
36 The Wheeling provision required utilities to allow independent electricity

generators to transmit their electricity over the utilities' distribution grids. See
Kearney & Merril, supra note 1, at 1354.
37 Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 2154001; Kearney & Merril, supra note 1, at 1354.
38 Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 2154001.
39 Id.

350

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 14: 345

transmitted within and across states, but could not ensure its
distribution to end consumers. 4 0 Ensuring the provision of service to
end-users was left to the individual states.41
By 1996, twelve states had expanded on the federal
government's attempt to deregulate the transmission market by
introducing retail-wheeling provisions for local distribution
markets. 4 2 Additionally, forty-one states were actively involved in
restructuring their electricity markets. 43 Today, twenty-four states
have passed deregulation 44legislation, including Illinois, which has a
retail-wheeling provision.
B. Illinois Deregulation Legislation as a Model
Illinois deregulation legislation illustrates the differences
between the electric generation, transmission, and distribution
markets.45 These statutes are drafted well and are representative of
what other states have enacted. Illinois passed this deregulating
legislation in 1997, creating a gradual reform in the Illinois electric
industry. 46 The reform is gradual because Illinois electric utilities are
required to continue offering all of their current services for the near
future. 47 One important element of the law is the introduction of
progressive rate cuts until the cost of electricity in Illinois is at or
below the Midwest average. 48 At the same time, the law
progressively49 opens the electricity generation
market to
competition, beginning with large customers 50 in October 1999,

40

Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21540-01.

41

Kearney & Merril, supra note 1, at 1354.

42

Williamson, supra note 2, at 43. A retail-wheeling provision requires

utilities to allow independent electricity generators to distribute their electricity to
consumers over the utilities' distribution grids under terms and conditions no less
favorable than those offered to the distributor's own generating affiliates.
43 Id.

44Id.
45

See generally 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-101 et seq. (1997).

46

See id.

48

Id. at 5/16-104.
Id. at 5/16-111.

49

Ld.

50

Large consumers are industrial and commercial customers with a demand of

47

at 5/16-104.
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other non-residential customers in December 2000, and residential
customers in May 2002.51 The legislation requires utilities to generate
electricity for customers who do not choose to purchase it from other
suppliers until at least 2007. 52 At that point, they must continue until
the state declares the electricity generation market competitive. 53 This
legislation may be considered deregulatory with respect to the
electricity generation market because it removes a number of state
regulations, leaving independent market forces to determine supply
and demand.
However, with respect to the distribution market, the new
legislation is anything but deregulatory. Illinois is requiring its
utilities, which had monopolies on the distribution market, to open
their distribution grid to carry electricity generated by competing
companies. 54 The utilities must provide distribution services to all
customers at cost-based rates approved by the Illinois Commerce
Commission ("ICC"), regardless of who generates their electricity.
The rates for delivery services will be established in tariffs filed by
the utilities and approved by the Commissioner, who is the head of
the ICC. 56 Moreover, as an aid to consumers, but a regulatory
fees will appear
hindrance to utilities, both delivery and generation
57
provide.
must
utility
the
which
on one bill,
The law also requires that any utility that owns or controls
transmission facilities must establish or join an Independent System
Operator ("ISO")." 8 An ISO will "manage and control transmission
facilities, ensure that buyers and sellers of power have equal access to
at least 4 megawatts, commercial customers with businesses at ten or more sites
with an aggregate coincidental peak demand of 9.5 megawatts or greater, and nonresidential customers accounting for one-third of the remaining electricity use of
their customer class. Id.
51 Id.
52

Id. at 5/15-103.

53 Id. A service is competitive if: (1) it is being offered by a provider other

than the utility to a defined customer group or geographic area at a comparable
price; (2)the utility is likely to lose or has lost business to the competitor; or (3) is

adequate transmission system capacity to deliver electricity to customers. Id. at
5/15-113.
54 Id. at 5/15-118.
51Id.at 5/15-111.
56 Id.

" Id.at 5/15-118.
58 Id. at 5/15-126.
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the grid, direct transmission activities, and ensure that needed
transmission maintenance and upgrades are implemented., 59 The ISO
will also "establish a competitive exchange auction for power in the
event that a spot market or other real-time market-based exchanges
do not develop for electricity. 6 °
Lastly, the legislation provides Illinois utilities with the means
to compete in the generation market, by permitting them to conduct
billing and pricing experiments for groups of customers with
common attributes. 1 These experiments may include consolidated
billing for customers under common62 ownership, real-time pricing, or
other billing or pricing experiments.
C. Federal Antitrust Law: The Sherman Act
As with many changes in legislation, state energy
deregulation bills are generating concerns about what legal avenues
are available to protect consumers against corporate abuse. One
source of protection against anticompetitive action is the Sherman
Act of 1890 ("Sherman Act"). 63 Specifically, § 1 of the Act protects
consumers from contracts or conspiracies that unreasonably restrain
trade or commerce, and 6 2 protects against monopolization and
attempted monopolization. The Sherman Act is intended to promote
Citizen's Utility Board, supra note 6. See also 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15126 (1997).
59

60

Citizen's Utility Board, supra note 6. See also 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-

126 (1997).
61 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-106, 107.
62

Id.

63

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994).

64

Id. § 1. Section 1 of the Sherman Act states in pertinent part:

Every contract combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restrain of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person
who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony....
65 Id. § 2. Section 2 of the Sherman Act states in pertinent part:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ....
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and protect competition by imposing criminal sanctions for
violations, including fines and imprisonment. 66 As with many
antitrust violations, fines imposed under the Sherman Act are subject
to treble damages, and thus, often pose a substantial monetary
deterrent to anticompetitive behavior. As enacted, the Sherman Act
was very broad in its language and reach. 67 However, subsequent
statutory provisions, the jurisdiction of administrative agencies, and
Supreme
Court decisions have carved out exceptions to the Sherman
68
Act.
D. The State Action Doctrine
The Supreme Court first established the state action doctrine
in Parkerv. Brown.69 In an attempt to resolve a conflict between the
federal antitrust laws and state economic regulation, the Court in
Parker narrowly construed the Sherman Act 70 to exclude
anticompetitive state actions from antitrust prosecution. 7' California
had enacted legislation that restricted the manner in which producers
could market their crops "to restrict competition among growers and
maintain prices in the distribution of their commodities," a clearly
anticompetitive purpose. 72 The Court "relied on the principles of
federalism and state sovereignty to hold that the Sherman Act was
not intended to prohibit states from imposing restraints on
competition."73 The Court reasoned that principals of federalism
required considerable deference to states because they played an
important role in economic regulation, and because states should
have the authority 74to establish and implement their own individual
economic policies. The Court also looked to the language of the
66

Candice Jones, David Lee & Adrian Shin, Antitrust Violations, 38 AM.

CRIM. L. REv. 431, 432 (2001).
67 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2.
68

Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1455.

69 317 U.S. 341, 346 (1943).
70

15 U.S.C. § 1.

71Melissa K. Stull, J.D., Annotation,

What Constitutes "State Action"
Rendering Public Official's Participationin Private Antitrust Activity Immune from
Application of FederalAntitrust Laws, 109 A.L.R. FED. 758 (1992).
72 Parker,317 U.S. at 346; Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1457-58.
73 Trigen, 244 F.3d at 1225.
74 Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1457.
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Sherman Act and noted that it referred to individual agreements and
conspiracies, not the actions of state legislatures. 75 The state action
doctrine has been extended by subsequent cases to provide
immunization for three general categories of conduct: (1) action by a
state itself; 76 (2) action by a subdivision of the state like a state
agency or local government; 77 and (3) conduct of a private party
acting at the behest
of and with the supervision of a state or its
78
instrumentality.
In CaliforniaRetail Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
the Supreme Court set forth a two-prong test to determine whether
the state action doctrine applied to an action by an instrumentality of
the state. 79 The first prong required that the restraint on competition
be "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state
policy." 8° The second prong required 8 that "the policy must be
'actively supervised' by the State itself.", '
In Southern Motor CarriersRate Conference, Inc. v. United
States, the Court expanded the scope of the state action doctrine to
include protection of private parties' conduct, provided that the
parties' conduct satisfied the Midcal two-prong test. 82 In Southern
Motor Carriers,trucking companies were organizing rate bureaus to
jointly set their prices before they submitted them to the states' public
83
service
approval.
The state
allowedcommissions
and monitoredforthis
action because
they governments
believed that involved
it would

71
76

Parker,317 U.S. at 350-51; Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1457-58.
Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1459; Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568

(1984).
77 Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1459. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S.
773, 792 (1975) (recognizing that the state action doctrine applies to the actions of
a state agency, but does not apply to the facts of the case). See also City of
Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415 (1978) (holding that the
state action doctrine applies to the actions of municipalities).
78 Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1459. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S.
579, 594-95 (1976). See also S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United
States, 471 U.S. 48, 66 (1985).
79 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
80

Id.

81 Id.
82

S. Motor Carriers,471 U.S. at 50-5 1.

83

Id.; Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1462.
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lessen their regulatory burden. 84 The Supreme Court found that this
rational satisfied the Midcal test. This article will analyze a recent
application of the state action doctrine to a private party, an electric
utility company, and its possible ramifications for newly enacted state
energy deregulation legislation.

III. The Trigen Case
In Trigen-Oklahoma City Energy Corp. v. Oklahoma Gas &
Electric Co., the state action doctrine was applied to immunize an
86
electric utility company from the Sherman Act for the first time.
Trigen-Oklahoma City Energy Corp. ("Trigen"), a private company
that owned and operated heating-and-cooling plants in Oklahoma,
sued Oklahoma Gas & Electric ("OG&E"), a regulated electric utility
that served communities in Oklahoma and Arkansas. 87 Trigen
produced steam and chilled water, which it pumped from a central
station through its underground pipeline to its customers. 88 OG&E
attempted to persuade Trigen's customers to purchase cooling
equipment ("chillers") from a third party for installation in the
customers' buildings. Buildings that use electric chillers 9consume
more electricity for cooling than buildings served by Trigen. 0
At trial, Trigen sought twenty years of lost profits from
OG&E, alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization in
violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, unreasonable restraint of trade,
and discrimination in violation of Oklahoma law. 91 Trigen alleged
three anticompetitive incidents. 92 First, Trigen & OG&E competed
for Oklahoma County buildings' heating contracts, and in 1989, the
County signed a one-year renewable contract with Trigen. 93 Four
years later, the County Board began investigating installing onsite
84 S. Motor Carriers,471 U.S. at 50-51; Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1462.
85 S. Motor Carriers,471 U.S. at 50-51.
86

244 F.3d at 1223.

87

Id.

88

Id.

89

id.

90 Id.
91 Id.
92

Id. at 1223-24.

93

Id. at 1223.
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chillers. 94 OG&E conducted a study for the county and concluded
that they could save a significant amount of money by installing
onsite chillers. 95 The county decided to buy the chillers, thus
increasing their OG&E
electricity consumption and terminating their
96
Trigen.
with
contract
Second, Trigen and OG&E competed to win the contract to
serve the Myriad Convention Center, a city building. 97 After OG&E
offered to include the city in an experimental real-time pricing tariff
that would save significant amounts of money, the city chose
OG&E. 98
Third, Trigen and OG&E competed for Corporate Tower's
business. 99 Previously, Trigen and Corporate Tower, a large private
Oklahoma City building, had a ten-year contract with two five-year
renewal options. 100 When the ten-year contract was near expiration,
OG&E provided the Corporate Tower building manager with
information about how to evaluate on-site cooling, offered to pay for
a feasibility study, sponsored an informational breakfast and energy
conference, and had its lawyers evaluate the contract with Trigen for
termination options. 01° Corporate Tower terminated its contract with
Trigen after the first ten years and installed an onsite cooling
system. 10 2 A jury found for Trigen on all counts, except attempted
monopolization. In January 2000, the trial court awarded treble
damages, entering a judgment against OG&E for $20,641,548.103
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, OG&E
argued that the state action doctrine immunized its conduct from
federal antitrust scrutiny because the state had made the decision to
104 The Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court and
regulate
them.
applied the
Midcal
test, finding that Oklahoma (1) had clearly
94 Trigen, 244 F.3d at 1223.
95 id.
96

Id. at 1224.

97 Id.
98

Id.

99 Id.

100

Id.

1o Id.
102

Id.

103

Id.

104

Id. at 1225.
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articulated a policy to displace competition within the electric utility
market; and (2) actively supervises any alleged anticompetitive
conduct. 0 5 As a result, the court held that the case satisfied the
Midcal test and the state action doctrine immunized OG&E's
electricity-related business activity from federal antitrust scrutiny. 106
The court reasoned that in order to meet the "clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed" prong of the test, a private
party need not "point to specific detailed legislative authorization"
for the challenged conduct, but needs only to show that the state
made clear its intent to replace competition with a regulatory program
in a particular field.' °7 The fact that the Oklahoma Constitution
clearly manifested the state's intent to displace competition with
08
regulation over electric utilities was sufficient to satisfy this prong.'
The "actively supervised" prong was fulfilled because the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission had the power to fix all of OG&E's rates
for electricity and promulgate all rules and regulations that affected
OG&E's services, operation, and management* °9 Because the "heart
of Trigen's complaint was mainly that OG&E's rates were too low
and that Trigen had to lower its rates or lose business," the action was
not enough to warrant Sherman Act intervention.' 10 The Court also
reiterated that there was no conspiracy or bribery exception to state
action immunity."' The Supreme Court denied Trigen's writ of
certiorari without comment, leaving this case as the sole appellate
court precedent expanding the state action doctrine to an electric
utility company.
Public opinion about the decision abounds. OG&E and its
supporters contend that the Tenth Circuit, in its opinion, and the
Supreme Court, in denying certiorari, made the correct decisions,
while Trigen and its supporters feel that the courts erred."l 3 The

105 Id.
106

id.

" Id. at 1226.
Id.

108

109 Id.
110 Id. at 1229.

...Id. at 1227.
112 Trigen-Oklahoma City Energy Corp. v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 122 S. Ct.
459 (2001).
113Users, Others Seek High Court Review of Utility Antitrust Immunity
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Electricity Consumers Resource Council, the National Energy
Marketers Association, and the Independent Petroleum Association
of America submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court in
support of Trigen's position, arguing that "if anticompetitive actions
are given antitrust immunity under the so-called 'state action
doctrine' for state-regulated utilities, market participation would be
chilled and consumers and businesses would not realize the benefits
of competition. ' "" 4 The brief also noted that "as the electricity
industry is restructuring under mandates by the federal and state
governments, incumbent utilities want to preserve their monopoly
15
benefits, making vigilant enforcement of antitrust laws vital."
Finally, the group argued that "OG&E's anti-competitive conduct is a
direct response to competition from Trigen" and "[c]lothing such
responses in antitrust immunity will thus frustrate
federal and state
116
efforts to restructure the electricity industry.,
The United States Combined Heat and Power Association,
American Gas Cooling Center, the International District Energy
Association, and Distributed Power Coalition of America also
submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court in favor of
Trigen's position. 117 That brief predicted that market evolution and
public policy would "be frustrated if state action immunity is
118
extended as it would [be] by the [Tenth] Circuit" decision.
According to the energy services groups, the Tenth circuit "wholly
failed to consider the adequacy of the state's supervision of OG&E's
anticompetitive actions," and "[a]s a result, this case presents an issue
of critical importance to the competitive strength of the national
market for energy services.' 1 19 Other groups also filed amici curiae
briefs on behalf of OG&E, supporting the Tenth Circuit and arguing
that its decision was not an extension of the state action doctrine, but

Decision, ELECTRIC UTIL. WEEK, Oct. 8, 2001, Litigation at 10.
114 id.

115 Id.
116

Id. (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae Electricity Consumers Resource

Council et al., Trigen-Oklahoma City Energy Corp. v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 122
S. Ct. 459 (2001)).
117

Id.

18 Id. (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae United States Combined Heat and

Power Association et al., Trigen-Oklahoma City Energy Corp. v. Okla. Gas & Elec.
Co., 122 S. Ct. 459 (2001)).
119 Id.
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merely followed well-established precedent. 120

IV. Analysis
This author posits that the Tenth Circuit correctly applied
established precedent and did not extend the state action immunity
doctrine in Trigen. Previous Supreme Court cases have already
extended the doctrine to the actions of private parties, using the
Midcal test.' 21 Under the sound reasoning of the Tenth Circuit,
OG&E satisfied the Midcal test, thus immunizing it from federal
antitrust prosecution. 122 While the legal reasoning in this case is
sound, its practical application to state deregulation attempts could be
devastating. The policy arguments made in the amicus briefs
supporting Trigen's position are persuasive and should be explored.
Expanding the state action doctrine to immunize state utilities could
greatly stifle state attempts to introduce competition into the
electricity market.
Under Trigen, state utilities in the electric distribution market
are immune from antitrust violation prosecution under the state action
doctrine because state "deregulation" laws maintain monopoly power
and state regulatory control over electricity distribution. Moreover, in
states with gradual deregulation, state utilities are also immune from
prosecution in the generation market until the market is declared
competitive. This immunization window can give state utilities the
opportunity to take anticompetitive actions to preserve their market
share and prevent competitors from entering the generation market.
This scenario may be illustrated using the Illinois deregulation law as
an example.
In Illinois, electricity distribution will remain a state-regulated
monopoly. Thus, Illinois utilities' actions in relation to that market
will be immune from federal antitrust violations under Trigen.123 The
electric generation market will not be declared competitive until at
least 2007.124 Until the market is declared competitive, utility
companies will be generating electricity and selling it at stateregulated prices, thus exempting them from antitrust violations in the
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generation market, as well. 125 Additionally, Illinois deregulation laws
provide Illinois utilities with the ability to conduct billing and pricing
"experiments" for groups of consumers with common attributes.
Permissible experiments may include consolidated billing for
customers under common ownership, real-time pricing, or other
billing experiments. 27 Since Illinois utilities have a monopoly on the
electricity distribution markets, they could use that advantage to
create incentives, through real-time pricing or other billing
experiments, in order to entice companies to use them for electricity
generation as well. These are some of the very same tactics OG&E
used to obtain Trigen contracts and virtually drive Trigen out of the
Oklahoma market. 28 It is very possible that Illinois utilities could
engage in such "approved" anticompetitive practices to maintain their
electric generation market share and drive out competitors.

V. Impact
Illinois utility companies have begun to lose market share in
the generation market and are poised to regain the ground they have
lost. 29 Their competition in that market is growing quickly.130 While
deregulation in the Illinois electricity generation market has been
slow to catch on, 131 the 2001 economic downturn has prompted
companies to closely analyze their energy bills.' 32 There are currently
eighteen companies approved to sell electricity in Illinois. 133 Since
October 1, 1999, more than 15,300 Illinois companies have left
Commonwealth Edison Co. ("ComEd"), the primary supplier of
electricity, either completely or partially.' 34 That amounts to 2.9
percent of all businesses in Illinois, the vast majority of which are
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large power-users. 135 This increase in competition is a good sign for
consumers, as competition in markets usually leads to lower retail
prices.
Local utilities will not sit idly by while their customers leave.
One fear is that they will use their monopoly power on the
distribution market to drive out competition. The price for
distribution will be established by state-regulated tariffs, which had
not yet been decided at the time of printing. ComEd has asked for
permission to increase what it charges businesses for distribution by
an average of 26 percent.' 36 This should be worrisome for consumers
because if distribution prices are too high, electricity from a nonComEd supplier would be too expensive to sell in Illinois because
out-of-state suppliers rely on ComEd's distribution
channels, and
137
would be "priced out" of the Illinois market.
Competition in the generation market posses the best chance
for consumers to see a decrease in energy prices. If the utilities are
allowed to drive out competitors under this exception before
competition in the generation market is fully integrated, it may never
become integrated. Without competitive generation markets, states
will revert back to government-regulated monopolies with fixed
prices that may be artificially high. State utilities do not want to see a
decrease and may take anticompetitive steps to prevent this, the worst
of all worlds.
Even with immunity from federal antitrust prosecution,
utilities are open to state antitrust and tort suits. However, many
states place the jurisdiction for these claims with state agencies such
as the Illinois Commerce Commission and the Oklahoma Commerce
Commission. Suits before such agencies do not carry the same
deterrent effect as a highly publicized federal lawsuit. Additionally,
the punishments in federal court are often more substantial than those
imposed by a state agency.

VI. Conclusion
It is too soon to tell whether the speculation about the effects
of the Trigen decision will turn the lights out on state energy
deregulation attempts, or whether the light will continue to shine
brightly. If the actions of OG&E are any indication, state utility
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markets will not open to competition. State utilities will use every
weapon in their arsenals to protect their market share, limiting
competition, thus artificially inflating electricity prices and harming
consumers. Under Trigen, the utilities may be taking these
anticompetitive actions under a cloak of immunity provided by the
state action immunity doctrine. This, in the end, will be detrimental to
consumers, who would have little redress.

